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In natural situations, movements are often directed
toward locations different from that of the evoking
sensory stimulus. Movement goals must then be in-
ferred from the sensory cue based on rules. When
there is uncertainty about the rule that applies for
a given cue, planning a movement involves both
choosing the relevant rule and computing the move-
ment goal based on that rule. Under these condi-
tions, it is not clear whether primates compute
multiple movement goals based on all possible rules
before choosing an action, or whether they first
choose a rule and then only represent the movement
goal associated with that rule. Supporting the former
hypothesis, we show that neurons in the frontoparie-
tal reach areas of monkeys simultaneously represent
two different rule-based movement goals, which are
biased by the monkeys’ choice preferences. Appar-
ently, primates choose between multiple behavioral
options by weighing against each other the move-
ment goals associated with each option.
INTRODUCTION
When passing the ball to a player of his team, a soccer player can
identify and select the proper target among many potential
targets by the color of the jerseys. In this situation the physical
targets are identical to potential targets of action (Figure 1A,
left). However, when a striker is approaching the opponent
goal, multiple alternative action goals have to be inferred from
a single physical target (the goal keeper) via spatial transforma-
tion rules (Figure 1A, right). The striker might want to aim for the
goal keeper, speculating that he or she will jump away, or for the
opposite corner of the goal, hoping that the keeper stays.
Recently, a lot has been learned on how primates represent
and decide between multiple physical targets in target-selection
tasks, and how different frontal and parietal cortical areas
contribute to target valuation and selection (Sugrue et al.,
2005; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Churchland et al., 2008; Rangel
et al., 2008; Andersen and Cui, 2009; Kable and Glimcher,
2009; Kim and Basso, 2010; Bisley and Goldberg, 2010; Cisek
and Kalaska, 2010). Little is known, however, about decision536 Neuron 70, 536–548, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.processes in rule-selection tasks, which require choosing
among goals based on a spatial transformation rule (Tremblay
et al., 2002), and in which alternative goals might not be physi-
cally present as target stimuli, but have to be spatially inferred,
like in the example of the striker.
In rule-selection experiments, alternative movements are con-
ducted under identical spatial sensory conditions, but according
to different context-defined transformation rules (Wise et al.,
1996; Wallis and Miller, 2003). In antisaccade or antireach tasks
(Figure 1A, right) a single visuospatial input is associated with
two alternative movement goals: one that is directly cued by
the sensory input (aim at the keeper), and another that has to
be inferred from a spatial cue by applying a remapping rule
(aim at the corner of the soccer goal opposite to the keeper)
(Crammond and Kalaska, 1994; Shen and Alexander, 1997;
Schlag-Rey et al., 1997; Everling et al., 1999; Zhang and Barash,
2004; Medendorp et al., 2005; Gail and Andersen, 2006). Two
alternative decision processes are conceivable in such rule-
selection tasks. The sensorimotor system could first choose
among the alternative rules, and then only compute one senso-
rimotor transformation to encode the single motor goal that is
associated with the selected rule (rule-selection hypothesis).
Alternatively, the system could first compute all potential senso-
rimotor transformations, and then select among the multiple
resulting motor-goal options (goal-selection hypothesis).
The difference between the rule- and goal-selection hypoth-
eses should become obvious in areas of the brain that have
‘‘spatial competence’’ for movement planning, i.e., areas that
exhibit spatially selective neural encoding of motor goal informa-
tion. This is the case, for example, in the premotor cortex
(Weinrich and Wise, 1982; Snyder et al., 1997; Crammond and
Kalaska, 2000) and the posterior parietal cortex (Mountcastle
et al., 1975; Snyder et al., 1997; Batista et al., 1999; Gail and
Andersen, 2006). The rule-selection hypothesis predicts that
such areas only encode one goal at a time, according to the
preliminarily selected rule, but not multiple rule-based potential
goals simultaneously (Figure 1B, left). The goal-selection hypoth-
esis predicts that they simultaneously encode all alternative
potential movement goals prior to the decision (Figure 1B, right).
Therefore, the two hypotheses are distinguishable only at prede-
cision stages, where the simultaneous existence of multiple,
alternative, potential motor goals in a rule-selection task would
favor the goal-selection hypothesis.
Evidence for potential motor goal encoding in spatial rule
selection tasks, i.e., in situations like in the example of the
striker, is lacking. Several areas of the brain have been thought
AB
Figure 1. Target-Selection versus Rule-
Selection Task
(A) In a target-selection task (left) two distinguish-
able (e.g. colored) spatial cues (targets) are pre-
sented, of which one should be chosen as move-
ment goal according to a selection rule. Both
potential targets have been spatially specified
before the selection. In our rule-selection task only
one spatial cue is provided, while the goal of the
movement can be the position of the spatial cue
(direct rule) or diametrically opposite to it (inferred
rule).
(B) Neural rule- or goal-selection encoding in
a rule-selection task. Decisions in ambiguous rule-
selection tasks might follow a ‘‘rule selection’’
hypothesis (left columns). The rule will first be
selected, and then be applied to the spatial cue to
compute the single associated spatial motor goal.
In spatial planning areas there will be either no
spatial information encoded (solid red), or a
memory of the spatial cue location (dotted orange)
prior to the final selection. The ‘‘motor-goal
selection’’ hypothesis (right columns) states that
both alternative rules are applied to the spatial cue
to create two competing spatial representations
for the direct and the inferred motor goal, which
may (dotted orange) or may not (solid red) be
modulated by choice preferences of the subject.
Note that the initial spatial encoding during the
spatial cue presentation and the postdecision
encoding of the final motor goal are identical in
both hypotheses.
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Rule-Based Potential Action Goalsto encode multiple potential motor goals in space, but only in
experiments involving selection among multiple physical
targets (Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Cisek and Kalaska, 2005;
Lau and Glimcher, 2008). However, in such tasks, multiple
alternative spatial representations in the neural activity could
be associated with multiple physical targets rather than motor
goals. Therefore, target selection tasks are unsuitable for distin-Neuron 70, 536–guishing between the rule- and the goal-
selection hypotheses. We measured the
spatial selectivity of neurons in monkey
parietal and premotor cortex duringreach planning in a novel rule-selection task (Figure 2). We
show that two spatial, rule-based potential motor goals can
be simultaneously encoded, supporting the goal-selection
hypothesis.
Potential motor goals can encode all alternative choices as
defined by the task (options), or biased representations of all
choices based on previous reward experience (preferences),Figure 2. Rule-SelectionTaskwith Instructed
Delay
In our potential motor-goal (PMG) task a single
spatial cuewas presented at one of the four cardinal
directions prior to a memory period. 60%–80% of
the trials were context-instruction trials (PMG-CI) in
which a contextual cue was shown in a second cue
period (‘‘GO’’). This contextual cue instructed
a direct reach toward the position of the preceding
spatial cue (green) or an inferred reach toward the
diametrically opposite direction (blue). In 20%–40%
of the trialsnocontextual cuewas shown (PMG-NC),
and themonkeyswere free to choose the goal either
according to the direct or inferred transformation
rule.
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Rule-Based Potential Action Goalsdepending on which stage of the decision process they repre-
sent. So far, empirical evidence for preference encoding has
been lacking for skeletomotor tasks, even in target selection
experiments. Many previous oculomotor studies showed modu-
lation of neural target responses by choice probability or some
form of value assignment (preference encoding) in different brain
areas of monkey (Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Dorris and Munoz,
1998; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004; Dorris and
Glimcher, 2004; Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Lau and Glimcher,
2008; Kim and Basso, 2010; Louie and Glimcher, 2010) and
human (Hampton et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Yanai
et al., 2008; Wunderlich et al., 2009). Target-selection experi-
ments using skeletomotor behavior, like reaching, showed en-
coding of freely selected targets in the parietal reach region
(PRR) (Scherberger and Andersen, 2007; Pesaran et al., 2008),
and potential motor goal encoding in the dorsal premotor cortex
(PMd) of monkeys (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005), but the task
designs in these studies did not allow dissociation of option
versus preference encoding. We tested for the encoding of
options versus preferences by using a mixture of instructed and
free-choice trials in combination with different probabilistic
reward schemes. We show that potential motor goal signals in
monkey parietal and premotor cortex during reach planning
represent mostly choice preferences, rather than options or
preliminary selections.
RESULTS
Balanced Choices between Alternative Rule-Based
Motor Goals
To distinguish between the rule- and goal-selection hypotheses
we first tested if two potential rule-based motor goals can be en-
coded simultaneously, since this would provide evidence for the
goal-selection hypothesis (Figure 1B, right). We designed
a potential motor goal (PMG) task, in which subjects had to
choose between two rule-based motor goals in each trial, and
characterized the spatial selectivity of neural activity as a function
of the spatial motor goal(s) during ambiguous reach planning.
Twomale rhesus monkeys were trained to perform amemory-
guided antireach task with instructed delay (Figure 2). A single
spatial cue was combined with an optional contextual color
cue. The contextual cue defined one of two spatial transforma-
tion rules according to which the spatial cue had to be mapped
onto the associated motor goal. The reach goal could either be
identical to the spatial cue (direct reach) or opposite to it (inferred
reach). In each trial of this PMG task, both options were available
in parallel to the subjects during reach planning, since the
contextual cue was presented only at the end of the instructed
delay, while the spatial cue was presented prior to the delay.
The PMG task consisted of two randomly interleaved trial
types, either with context instruction at the end of the delay
period (PMG-CI, 60%–80%), or without context instruction (no
context, PMG-NC, 20%–40%). We used the ‘‘free-choice’’
PMG-NC trials to probe the subjects’ behavioral choice prefer-
ences, and manipulated the subject’s choice preferences by
varying the reward schedules (see below).
The performance in PMG-CI trials was high for both monkeys
(PMG-CI: 88 ± 1% [monkey A], 80 ± 1.4% [monkey S]). Most538 Neuron 70, 536–548, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.errors could be attributed to ocular fixation breaks, while
improper choices in instructed trials, i.e., confusions of the direct
and inferred reach goal, were rare in both monkeys (<2%). In the
PMG-NC trials, both direct- and inferred-goal choices with
proper ocular fixation and timing were considered correct, while
reaches to any other directions were considered incorrect. In the
first data set we are going to present, correct PMG-NC trials
were rewarded according to a bias minimizing reward schedule
(BMRS).
The BMRS was designed to reinforce balanced choice
behavior, by taking the reward history of the monkey into
account and reducing the reward probability if the behavior
was biased. In the BMRS, random behavior with an equal
amount of choices for either motor goal (on a short-term average
across few trials) leads to 50% reward probability, while any
consistent bias in choices leads to lower reward probabilities
(see Experimental Procedures). With the BMRS, the direct
choices (40 ± 0.1%, monkey A; 39.4 ± 2.5%, monkey S) and in-
ferred choices (48.7 ± 0.1%, monkey A; 44.9 ± 2.6%, monkey S)
were mostly balanced, with only a small bias in favor of inferred
choices (Figure 3A). The overall balance between direct and in-
ferred reach choices in PMG-NC trials suggests that the
monkeys had close-to-equal preference for the two potential
motor goals in BMRS sessions (= balanced data set).
Rule Selection versus Goal Selection—Potential Motor
Goal Encoding
According to the goal-selection hypothesis, the planning of two
equipotent alternative actions should lead to the neural encoding
of both corresponding motor goal representations simulta-
neously. According to the rule-selection hypothesis, we would
have to expect only one motor goal representation at a time
despite balanced behavioral choices on average (Figure 1B). In
the balanced choice condition, we recorded 145 (66 [A], 79 [S])
neurons in PRR, of which 97 (67%; 49 [A], 48 [S]) fulfilled the
criteria to be tested for the encoding of potential motor goals
(see Experimental Procedures). For the purpose of separating
the rule-selection from the goal-selection hypothesis PMG-CI
and PMG-NC trials were analyzed jointly, since the trial types
are indistinguishable and unpredictable to the subjects prior to
the optional contextual cue at the time of the GO signal.
Figure 3B shows an example neuron from PRR with a bimodal
spatial selectivity profile from the balanced data set in the PMG
task. We first tested the neurons spatial selectivity in two refer-
ence conditions. In the definite motor goal (DMG) task the
monkeys were unambiguously instructed about the pending
motor goal prior to memory period, i.e., the spatial and the
contextual cue were shown at the beginning of the memory
period (see Experimental Procedures). During such unambig-
uous planning in the DMG task, the neuron’s responses reflected
the unique downward motor goal in the ‘‘direct’’ (Figure 3B, left)
and ‘‘inferred’’ (Figure 3B, center) context. This is indicated by
the selectivity profiles for direct and inferred reaches that show
the neural response as a function of the cue position, and that
are shifted by 180 relative to each other (Figure 3B, bottom).
Such motor-goal selectivity is characteristic for PRR (Gail and
Andersen, 2006; Gail et al., 2009), and common to most direc-
tionally selective neurons of the current study (>80% across
AC
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Figure 3. Neural Encoding of Potential Motor Goals in a Data Set with Balanced Choice Behavior
(A) Balanced percentage of direct (green) and inferred (blue) choices in PMG-NC trials with a bias minimizing reward schedule (BMRS; n = total number of
behavioral testing days for both monkeys; error bars denote SEM).
(B) Response of an example PRR neuron. The top panels show the spike rasters in the definite motor goal (DMG) task with the direct rule (left column), the inferred
rule (center) and in the PMG task (right), with average responses for each spatial cue position (0, 90, 180, and 270) below. Trials were aligned to the GO signal,
while ‘‘cue’’ marks the average onset time of the spatial cue. Pictograms at the side of the spike rasters illustrate the spatial cue positions (filled squares) and the
corresponding motor goal positions (open squares) according to the task. The bottom panels show the selectivity profiles of the neuron (average rate) as
a function of cue position in the late memory period (shaded time window). Selectivity profiles were interpolated for illustrative purposes only. The shaded curves
denote the SEM.
(C) Population results for the balanced data set in PRR. The average normalized activity of all eligible PRR neurons during the PMG-CI task is shown aligned to the
spatial cue onset, the GO signal, and the movement onset (dotted red lines). Selectivity profiles were aligned to the neurons’ preferred directions in DMG trials
before averaging (PD, preferred direction; OD, opposite-to-preferred direction). Direct-cued and inferred-cued PMG-CI trials physically differ only at the time of
the context instruction, hence, data are plotted jointly for the cue and memory periods. The inset shows the distribution of direction modality contrast (DMC)
values for all eligible neurons in the late memory period.
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Figure 4. Encoding of Potential Motor Goals versus Preliminary Selections
(A) Schematic description of how to test the two alternative hypotheses with a choice-selective analysis of the free-choice trials (PMG-NC). Bimodal selectivity in
the PMG trials could be the result of averaging across trials with alternating preliminary selection of either of the two potential motor goals (lower row), or reflect
potential motor-goal encoding proper, independent of the later choice (top row). The similarity of the absolute DMC values, computed separately for direct-choice
(green) and inferred-choice (blue) trials, with the choice-indifferent absolute DMC values, computed for all trials, allows to differentiate the two possibilities (see
Figure S2 for a control).
(B) Choice-selective versus choice-indifferent absolute DMC values. The difference histogram shows that there is no significant deviation from the unity line,
indicating encoding of two potential motor goals, and contradicting preliminary selection encoding.
Neuron
Rule-Based Potential Action Goalsdata sets). Importantly, in the ambiguous PMG task (Figure 3B,
right), the neuron was always most active if the previous spatial
cue in a PMG task potentially indicated a downward (270) reach,
i.e., when it had appeared either at the upper (90) or lower (270)
position. Since the spatial selectivity profile is plotted as a func-
tion of cue location, the bimodal activity profile with a peak sepa-
ration of 180 indicates encoding of a single motor-goal direction
in two different cue conditions, not two different motor-goal
directions. Notably, the neuron was not active in trials with
right-side (0) or left-side (180) cues, but only for those two
directions (up and down) that were equally probable to instruct
a downward motor goal.
The bimodal response profile of the example neuron in Fig-
ure 3B in the PMG taskmatched the prediction of the goal-selec-
tion hypothesis, and contradicts the rule-selection hypothesis.
The bimodal profile mimicked the response pattern one would
expect when averaging (not summing) the two response profiles
in the DMG task. This means, the response pattern during plan-
ning of two equipotent alternative potential motor goals was an
equally weighted linear combination of the response patterns
during unambiguous planning of the two respective unique
motor goals. In a model-based analysis we quantitatively
confirmed this view (see Figures S1 and S4 available online).
Bimodal selectivity profiles dominated the balanced data set
in PRR. The average population activity in the balanced data
set shows two stable ridges of activity during the memory period
(Figure 3C). Since the cue-position axis marks the location of the
spatial cue relative to the preferred direction (PD) of each neuron
(as measured in the DMG task), the two ridges indicate that on
the population level the direct and inferred goals are represented540 Neuron 70, 536–548, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.simultaneously during ambiguous reach planning. For quantita-
tive analysis we characterized the bimodal versus unimodal
selectivity of each neuron with a direction modality contrast
(DMC). Positive DMC indices indicate selectivity for the direct
motor goal; negative values indicate selectivity for the inferred
motor goal. Indices close to zero indicate symmetric bimodal
tuning (not lack of tuning) since only directionally selective
neurons were considered (see Experimental Procedures). The
mean DMC of the balanced data set did not significantly deviate
from zero (m = 0.001; standard error of the mean [SEM] = 0.021,
p > 0.05), indicating that in the balanced data set most neurons
had bimodal selectivity profiles (Figure 3C, inset).
Potential Motor Goals or Preliminary Selections?
Choice-Selective Analysis in PRR
The existence of a bimodal neural selectivity pattern in the
balanced data set is not sufficient to demonstrate potential
motor goal encoding. The monkeys could have preliminarily
selected one of the two potential motor goals during the memory
period in every trial, and randomly switched their selection from
trial to trial. Such switching would be obscured in PMG-CI trials
due to the explicit context instruction at the time of the GO cue.
The bimodal selectivity pattern revealed by the above analyses
would denote an artifact of averaging across inhomogeneous
sets of trials in this case (Figure 4A, bottom).
With a choice-selective analysis of the free-choice (PMG-NC)
trials we can rule out this possibility. We can instead show that
both potential motor goals were encoded independently of the
monkey’s later choices (Figure 4A, top). If the monkeys made
preliminary selections in every trial then this selection should
Neuron
Rule-Based Potential Action Goalsbe reflected in an unambiguous neural encoding of this prelimi-
nary selection in the late memory period immediately prior to
the monkeys decision (preliminary selection encoding). We
sorted PMG-NC trials according to the choice of the monkey,
and computed DMC values of the neural activity in the late
memory period separately for the trials in which the monkeys
freely chose the direct and inferred goals. If the low DMC of
a neuron with bimodal selectivity was the averaging result of
two opposite unimodal selectivity profiles, one for direct-choice
trials and the other for the inferred-choice trials, then a low abso-
lute value of the original DMCwould be attended with high abso-
lute values of the two choice-selective DMC values for this
neuron. This means, preliminary selection encoding would be
indicated by a low similarity between the original and the
choice-selective DMC values across neurons (Figure 4A,
bottom). Vice versa, we can reject the selection hypothesis if
a neuron in both choice-selective subsets of trials shows
a bimodal selectivity pattern, i.e., when low absolute values of
the original DMC is attended with low absolute choice-selective
DMC values, resulting in a high similarity between original and
choice-selective DMC across neurons (Figure 4A, top).
The balanced data set in PRR yielded bimodal selectivity in
PMG-NC trials separately within direct-choice and within in-
ferred-choice trials. The absolute choice-selective DMC values
for direct- and inferred-choice trials were highly similar to the
absolute original DMC values (Figure 4B). This can be seen by
the fact that the average distance of the data points from the
unity line did not significantly differ from zero neither for direct-
(pd > 0.05) nor inferred-choice (pi > 0.05) trials. When—as
a control—themethodwas applied to theDMGdata set, in which
we know that the monkeys had selected the motor goal already
during the memory period, then the choice-selective and original
DMCs were highly and significantly dissimilar (pd = 0.0012, pi =
0.00067; see Figure S2). Additional variance tests indicated
that it is unlikely that the bimodal selectivity profiles were the
consequence of rapid switching between two alternative prelim-
inary selections within the time of a trial (Figure S2).
Taken together, the results from the choice-selective analysis
of the balanced data set indicated genuine encoding of potential
motor goals rather than alternating preliminary selections in
PRR. This supports the motor-goal selection hypothesis and
argues against the rule-selection hypothesis.
Manipulating Behavioral Choice Preferences
Depending on which stage of the decision process a brain area
belongs to, encoding of multiple potential motor goals in that
area could represent the multiple options offered to the subject
(the ‘‘menu’’), or the competing behavioral goals associated
with these options and weighted with the subject’s preference
for either choice. Motor-goal options were defined solely by
the task. In any PMG trial two motor-goal options (the direct
and inferred motor goal) were valid during the memory period.
Encoding of motor-goal options should lead to the representa-
tions of two potential motor goals during the memory period of
all PMG trials, irrespective of any choice preferences of the
monkeys.Motor-goal preferences were defined by themonkeys’
average choice behavior in PMG-NC trials. Since the monkeys
had close-to-equal choice preferences for direct and inferredmotor goals in the balanced data set, the bimodal selectivity
profiles are not suited to dissociate encoding of motor-goal
options versus motor-goal preferences. If, on the other hand,
the monkeys had a bias in favor of one of the two options, then
encoding of motor-goal preferences should lead to neural activ-
ities in the memory period of PMG trials that reflect the relative
probability of selecting either potential goal in the PMG-NC trials.
By using different reward schedules we recorded two data sets,
one with balanced choice behavior (see above), and one with
strong behavioral choice bias, to dissociate the options and pref-
erence encoding hypotheses.
In the second data set, correct PMG-NC trials were rewarded
according to an equal probability reward schedule (EPRS). With
the EPRS, in which a 50% reward probability independent of the
choice history was guaranteed (reward probability: 52 ± 5%; p >
0.05 [A], 50 ± 4%; p > 0.05 [S]), both monkeys showed a strong
bias in favor of the inferred reach goal (Figure 5A), i.e., most rea-
ches in PMG-NC trials were directed toward the inferred motor
goal (85 ± 4.0% monkey A, 63 ± 4.1% monkey S), and only
a small fraction toward the direct goal (2.4 ± 0.8% monkey A,
17.8 ± 3.4% monkey S). In the remaining PMG-NC trials
(12.6% monkey A, 19.2% monkey S) the monkeys aborted the
trial without reaching, or reached toward one of the orthogonal
goals (<1%). This means that both monkeys had a preference
for the inferred goal when the transformation rule was unknown,
and when either goal selection was rewarded with equal proba-
bility in EPRS sessions (= biased data set).
We can only speculate about the reason for the intrinsic bias of
both monkeys during the EPRS (Figure S3). The reason behind
this behavior is not immediately relevant for the purpose of
dissociating options encoding from preference encoding at the
neural population level, though. It is sufficient to note that both
monkeys consistently had a similarly strong bias over an
extended period of time in the EPRS sessions, and little to no
bias in the BMRS sessions.
Options versus Preference Encoding in PRR
If neurons encoded behavioral choice preferences then we
would expect encoding of only the inferred motor goal in the
PMG trials of the biased data set, in contrast to the encoding
of both potential motor goals simultaneously as seen in the
balanced data set. This should be true in the late memory period
of all PMG trials, since PMG-CI trials are indistinguishable from
the PMG-NC trials prior to the GO signal, and were randomly
interleaved.
In PRR, the biased data set contained a total of 258 (159 [A], 99
[S]) recorded neurons. A total of 148 (57%) neurons (96 [A], 52 [S])
of the biased data set fulfilled the criterion for the analysis of
potential motor-goal encoding.
The PRR example neuron in Figure 5B was recorded in the
biased data set and was most active during planning of leftward
(180) reaches in direct-cued or inferred-cued DMG trials. In
PMG trials the neuron was only highly active if the spatial cue
was presented at the right side (0), i.e., as if an inferred instruc-
tion had been given externally or had been selected internally.
Such unimodal selectivity for the inferred goal dominated the
biased data set in PRR. The average normalized population
activity showed only a brief response increase when the cueNeuron 70, 536–548, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 541
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Figure 5. Neural Encoding of Motor Goal Preference in a Data Set with Biased Choice Behavior
(A) Biased percentage of direct (green) and inferred (blue) choices in PMG-NC trials with an equal probability reward schedule (EPRS). Same conventions apply as
in Figure 3.
(B) Example PRR neuron from the biased data set. It showed motor-goal selectivity in the DMG task, as did the example in Figure 3. But in the PMG task it is only
active if the spatial cue appears opposite to the neurons PD.
(C) Correspondingly, PRR population activity shows a strong representation at the opposite-to-cue position (OD) during thememory period. The DMCdistribution
is significantly biased for the inferred goal (mean DMC = 0.31; ***p < 0.001; rank-sum test).
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Rule-Based Potential Action Goalsmatched the preferred direction (PD) of the neurons. This was
followed by a high level of activity when the cue was opposite
to the PD, corresponding to an encoding of the inferred goal
throughout the memory period (Figure 5C). The mean DMC542 Neuron 70, 536–548, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.during the memory period of the biased data set was negative
(m = 0.31; SEM = 0.028) and significantly different from zero
(rank-sum test, p < 0.001) (Figure 5C, inset). This means that
the behavioral preference was reflected in a significant bias of
A B C
Figure 6. Potential Motor Goals in PMd
(A and B) Distribution of DMC values and the monkeys’ choice-behavior (insets) of the balanced (A) and biased (B) data sets. Same conventions apply as in
Figures 3 and 5 (***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, rank-sum test).
(C) The choice-selective analysis of the DMC similarity in PMd. Same conventions apply as in Figure 4.
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Rule-Based Potential Action Goalsthe neural directional selectivity in the population of PRR
neurons. The inferred-goal neural preference is neither consis-
tent with an unbiased equipotent encoding of the two task-
defined motor goal options (options hypothesis), nor with an
encoding of the previous instruction cue (visual memory), but it
is consistent with the preference hypothesis.
Based on the observed inferred-goal selectivity in the biased
data set alone, one could not dissociate preference encoding
from preliminary selection encoding. But we can argue against
the latter possibility based on the choice-independent bimodal
response profiles in the choice-selective analysis of the
balanced data set. Preliminary selection encoding would have
had to reveal direct-goal neural selectivity in direct-choice trials,
and inferred-goal selectivity in inferred-choice trials, which was
not the case (see above).Motor-Goal Encoding in Dorsal Premotor Cortex (PMd)
Another objective of our study was to compare parietal and pre-
motor sensorimotor areas, which are well known to be involved
in reach planning, while their role in reaching decisions is less
clear (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005; Scherberger and Andersen,
2007). We conducted the same analyses for PMd as for PRR
neurons. The biased data set contained 193 PMd neurons (118
monkey A, 75 monkey S), and the balanced data set 112 PMd
neurons (monkey S). Of those, 46% fulfilled the criteria for the
DMC analysis in the biased data set, and 40% in the balanced
data set, which denote smaller fractions of neurons than in
PRR (see above).
The analyses of potential motor-goal encoding in PMd re-
vealed overall very similar results to PRR, but there were also
differences. The distribution of DMC values in the biased data
set of PMd (Figure 6B) revealed a significant bias in favor of
the inferred motor goal (m = 0.298; SEM = 0.038, p < 1010, t
test), as it was the case in PRR (Figure 5C, inset). In contrast to
PRR (Figure 3C, inset), the DMC distribution in PMd (Figure 6A)
also showed a significant remaining bias for inferred goals(m = 0.11; SEM = 0.05, p = 0.004) in the balanced data set.
Note, though, that this bias in DMC values was significantly
smaller (p = 0.002) than in the biased data set, which indicates
that most neurons exhibited bimodal response profiles, while
few had a weak bias for the inferred goal. Since the monkeys
also had a small residual choice preference for the inferred
goal (Figure 3A) this could mean that PMd is more strongly
modulated by small choice preferences than PRR. The choice-
selective analyses of the PMG-NC trials showed a high DMC
similarity (Figure 6C), equivalent to PRR (Figure 4B). This, like
in PRR, indicated that the bimodal directional selectivity was
mostly not the consequence of preliminary selection encoding
in combination with trial-by-trial switching of the behavioral
choice. In summary, the PMd results are qualitatively very similar
to PRR, suggesting similar encoding schemes in both areas. For
a discussion of additional smaller differences between PRR and
PMd as revealed by our model-based analyses and variance
analyses see Figures S1 and S2.Normalization of Multiple Motor-Goal Representations
Models of decision making often involve mutual competition
between the neural representations of multiple coexisting alter-
native choices (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Cisek, 2006). Such
competition implies that the response of a neuron should be
reduced when its preferred motor goal marks only one out of
two equally valid behavioral options, compared to when the
motor goal is unambiguously selected. The responses of the
example neurons and the population activity plots in Figures 3
and 5 suggest that this is the case. The results indicate a halving
of the neural response strength to each potential motor goal in
the balanced PMG task compared to the corresponding unam-
biguous motor goal in the DMG task or biased PMG task. A
quantitative analysis of the weight coefficients (scaling factors)
in the model-based analysis confirmed this view (Figure S4).
The reduced neural response strengths during the simultaneous
presence of two alternative motor goals compared to a singleNeuron 70, 536–548, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 543
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goal representations.
DISCUSSION
The ability to plan multiple upcoming actions and decide among
them is vital to an organism acting within a complex environ-
ment.We investigated how parietal and premotor reach planning
areas encode the decision between different possible sensori-
motor transformation rules that could be applied to a single
visuospatial object. When monkeys were faced with two alterna-
tive spatial transformations, and chose them with equal prefer-
ence, then two separate spatial motor goal representations
coexisted in the frontoparietal reach network. This was the
case despite the fact that only one goal was directly visually
cued and the other had to be inferred from the visual cue by
applying a remapping rule. Additionally, the parietal reach region
(PRR) and the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) predominantly en-
coded the variable choice preference between two potential
motor goals. By using free-choice probe trials and two distinct
reward schedules, we could rule out encoding of the monkeys’
preliminary behavioral selections, as well as encoding of the
task-defined choice options, during movement planning. Our
results suggest that in rule-selection experiments the sensori-
motor system first computes all potential motor goals associated
with a currently valid set of potential transformation rules, weighs
them according to the subject’s choice preference, and then
selects among these goals.
Deciding among Alternative Action Plans Rather
than Transformation Rules or Targets
We showed that during movement planning two alternative
potential reach goals can be represented simultaneously in
PRR and PMd in a rule-selection task. In this task only one visuo-
spatial target was presented at a time, allowing two alternative
motor goals by applying two different mapping rules. Our results
suggest that with preexisting knowledge about the visuospatial
constraints of the task (knowing the spatial cue), and uncertainty
about the to-be-applied rule (not knowing the context cue), the
sensorimotor system constructs all remaining motor goal
options, which are defined by the general context of the task,
and are of subjective value to the monkey (see biased versus
balanced condition below). We can reject the alternative rule-
selection hypothesis according to which the monkeys in general
would first select a rule, and then only compute the single
associated motor plan. It is as if the sensorimotor system in
a rule-selection task first creates all potential motor-goal repre-
sentations and then applies the same computational decision
algorithms as in a target-selection task.
The view that multiple spatial motor goal options can be simul-
taneously encoded prior to the decision in parietal and premotor
areas is reminiscent of earlier saccadic target-selection experi-
ments in the superior colliculus (Basso and Wurtz, 1998) and
the lateral intraparietal area LIP (Platt and Glimcher, 1999;
Sugrue et al., 2004; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Yang and Shad-
len, 2007; Louie andGlimcher, 2010). They showed probabilistic,
graded neural responses for preferred and nonpreferred targets,
depending on saccadic choice probabilities or subjective values.544 Neuron 70, 536–548, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.Also, a study in PMd showed bimodal response profiles in
a manual two-target selection task (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005).
Our conclusions go beyond the previous findings, since these
studies showed the coexistence of multiple spatial representa-
tions associated with alternative choices, but used target-selec-
tion tasks. We show that the simultaneous representation of
mutually exclusive spatial motor goals in sensorimotor areas
does not require the presentation of multiple alternative spatial
physical target stimuli.
This simultaneous encoding of alternative competing motor
goals is also fundamentally different from the representation of
two sequential movement goals. Previous experiments showed
that in theparietal cortex, during theplanningof amulticomponent
(double-step) movement, two neural populations were activated,
each of which was selective for one of the single movement
components (Medendorp et al., 2006; Baldauf et al., 2008).
Double-step experiments do not induce a decision process
between mutually exclusive action goals, and rather suggest
thatmultiplecomponents of a complexmovement canbeplanned
at once. Our finding of simultaneous encoding of alternative
competing motor goals does complement previous observations
in effector-selection experiments, which showed that alternative
eyeorhandmovements to thesamespatial target, instructed (Cal-
ton et al., 2002) or freely chosen (Cui and Andersen, 2007), can
elicit simultaneous movement planning activity in LIP and PRR.
The advantage of the goal-selection scheme over the rule-
selection scheme for decision making could be that—by
computing all associatedmotor goal alternatives and their implicit
action plans during the ambiguous state of planning—a more
comprehensive cost-benefit calculation of each choice can be
achieved. When the striker in our introductory example has to
decide between aiming for the position of the goal keeper versus
theopposite corner, then it is not enough toconsider the likelihood
of the keeper to jump or stay. Also the costs associated with the
striker’s action alternatives are relevant, e.g., the striker might
be poor at aiming for right-side goals, or the ball might be in an
immediate position that eases aiming for one corner but not the
other.Our results imply that thedecisionprocess inour rule-selec-
tion experiment selected between competingmotor-goal alterna-
tives, not between different transformation rules or target stimuli,
and that this competition likely happened in the sensorimotor
areas that are involved in planning the respective movements.
Note, we do note rule out the possibility that in parallel
a competition between the two potential rules takes place in
rule-encoding frontal cortical areas (White and Wise, 1999;
Wallis et al., 2001; Wallis and Miller, 2003; Genovesio et al.,
2005). The rule-competition could then, in the extreme case,
just be mirrored by probabilistic motor goal representations in
downstream sensorimotor areas. Because of the observed
response normalization in our data (see below), we believe that
if at all there was a rule-competition in our task then it was paral-
leled by a goal-competition in the sensorimotor areas, which
would make sense for economical reasons, as discussed in
the previous paragraph (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010).
Preference versus Options Encoding
Potential motor-goal representations in our experiment de-
pended on the preference of the monkeys, as defined by the
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Rule-Based Potential Action Goalsprobability of behavioral choice of either action alternative. In our
task design we cannot differentiate between choice probabilities
and assigned subjective value (Sugrue et al., 2004; Samejima
et al., 2005; Hampton et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007;
Lau and Glimcher, 2008; Wunderlich et al., 2009), as was at-
tempted in a recent discounting experiment (Louie andGlimcher,
2010). Consequently, we speak more generally of preferences,
as quantified by choice probabilities.
Simultaneous potential motor-goal encoding during reach
planning had previously only been shown in PMd (Cisek and Ka-
laska, 2005). Since a dependence on the monkeys’ choice pref-
erences was not tested, it is unclear if this previous PMd data
reflected preferences or task-defined motor-goal options (the
menu, Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). The biased popula-
tion tuning in the memory period of our biased data set contra-
dicts options encoding, and suggests that potential motor-goal
encoding predominantly reflected choice preferences in PMd.
In posterior parietal cortex, preference encoding between
competing options has previously been shown in saccadic
target-selection tasks (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al.,
2004; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Yang and Shadlen, 2007;
Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Wunderlich et al., 2009; Louie and
Glimcher, 2010). Corresponding data for skeletomotor move-
ments, like reaching, and for rule-selection tasks in general is
lacking. Previous target-selection tasks with reaching revealed
post-GO-cue selection signals in PRR (Scherberger and
Andersen, 2007; Pesaran et al., 2008), but no neural response
modulations by choice preference was shown. Previous tasks
with deterministic targets showed reward- or value-dependent
modulations of the neural responses (Musallam et al., 2004;
Iyer et al., 2010), but relative weighing of alternative options
against each other was not tested.
Taken together, the principle of weighing alternative motor
goal representations with behavioral choice preferences is not
restricted to the saccade planning system, but can be found in
the skeletomotor system as well, and neural implementations
of this principle include not only parietal movement planning
areas, but also areas in the frontal cortex, like PMd.
Competing Goal Representations
Models of decision making often imply mutual competition
between the neural representations of multiple coexisting alter-
native choices (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Cisek, 2006). In our
experiment, this competition likely happened in the sensorimotor
areas that we recorded from and that are involved in planning the
respectivemovements, since we found reduced neural response
strengths during the simultaneous representation of two alterna-
tive motor goals compared to a single goal (Cisek and Kalaska,
2005).
Conclusions
Our findings support the idea that reach decision making and
movement planning, in tasks that require the selection of a spatial
transformation rule, are integrative rather than sequential
processes, mediated by overlapping action-specific neural pop-
ulations in PRR and PMd (Scherberger and Andersen, 2007;
Cisek, 2007; Andersen and Cui, 2009). The results provide
evidence for competitive encoding of alternative potential reachplans in PRR and PMd, reflecting the monkeys’ average choice
preferences, but being independent of the immediate behavioral
choice of the monkey. This is consistent with the idea that the
brain utilizes probabilistic representations throughout all stages
of the decision process until an action is finally required (Knill
and Pouget, 2004). Importantly, our results suggest that
in situations of uncertain choice of which transformation rule to
apply, the sensorimotor system can construct all potential motor
goal alternatives, and then select among these alternatives, once
enough evidence for a proper choice is available, rather than
preliminarily betting on one of the transformation rules and
computing only the single corresponding motor plan. This
strategy could denote a valuable and general principle in deci-
sion making, allowing a more comprehensive cost-benefit anal-
ysis that includes the consequential costs of the movements
associated with each choice.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Potential Motor Goal Task with Context Instruction
In PMG-CI trials (Figure 2), one spatial and one contextual visual cue were pre-
sented to the subjects at different times during the trial (ViewSonic VX922 LCD
screen; 5 ms off-on-off response time). The peripheral spatial cue was located
at one of four possible positions (0, 90, 180, and 270) with an eccentricity of
9 cm (14.5 visual angle, VA) relative to the fixation point. The contextual cue
consisted of a green (direct-cued) or blue (inferred-cued) frame around the
central eye and hand fixation points. It instructed the subject to reach toward
(direct, proreach) or to the position diametrically opposite of the spatial cue
(inferred, antireach).
A trial was initiated by themonkey by fixating a small red square in the center
of the screen (eye fixation tolerance: 2.0-3.0 VA; 224HzCCDcamera, ET-49B,
ThomasRecording, Giessen, Germany) and touching an adjacentwhite square
of the same size (hand fixation tolerance: 4.0 VA, touch screen mounted
directly in front of the video screen; IntelliTouch, ELO Systems, Menlo Park,
CA). After a random period of 500–1000 ms (fixation period) the spatial cue
was shown briefly for 200 ms. During the following 800–2000 ms (memory
period) only the fixation squares were visible. The contextual cue was shown
for 170ms at the end of thememory period and the hand fixation square disap-
peared (GOsignal). Themonkeyhad tomakea reach toward the instructedgoal
within amaximumof 700–1000ms (movement period, 4.9 VA reach tolerance)
and hold the goal position for 300–400 ms (feedback period). The monkey
received visual feedback about the correct movement goal (filled circle of the
samecolor as thecontextual cueat thegoal location) at the endof a correct trial.
Eye fixation had to be kept throughout the trial. Liquid reward and acoustic
feedback indicated correct (high pitch tone, reward) or incorrect (low pitch
tone, no reward) behavior. Correct choice of the instructed motor goal and
fixation behavior were required for a PMG-CI trial to be considered correct.
Only correct trials were used for the analysis.
Potential Motor Goal Task without Context Information
PMG-NC trials were similar to the PMG-CI trials, except that no contextual cue
was shown at the end of the memory period. In those trials the monkey had to
choosewhether to reach to the direct or to the inferred goal. Until the end of the
memory period PMG-CI and PMG-NC trials were indistinguishable. Only
PMG-NC trials in which the monkey either reached for the direct or the inferred
position were considered correct and were used for the analysis. Note that not
all of the correct trials were rewarded. Reward depended on the used reward
schedule (see below).
Definite Motor Goal Task
The DMG task differed from the PMG-CI trials only in the timing of the contex-
tual cue. In the DMG task the spatial and the contextual cue were shown simul-
taneously at the beginning of the memory period. Only DMG trials with correct
choices and ocular fixation were rewarded and analyzed.Neuron 70, 536–548, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 545
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The PMG and DMG tasks were presented in separate blocks. The DMG block
consisted of typically 100 trials, the PMG block of a minimum of 300 trials.
The order of the two tasks was variable across days.
PMG-NC and PMG-CI trials were randomly interleaved during PMG blocks.
A PMG block contained 60%–80% (mean = 76%) PMG-CI trials and
20%–40% (mean = 24%) PMG-NC trials. In each task the four spatial cuing
directions were randomly interleaved with equal probability. In PMG-CI trials
and in the DMG task the direct-cued and inferred-cued trials were also
randomly interleaved with equal probability.
Reward Schedules in PMG-NC Trials
We implemented two different reward schedules for PMG-NC trials.
One was the bias-minimizing reward schedule (BMRS). With a BMRS
balanced behavior, i.e., 50% direct and 50% inferred reaches, leads to
a 50% reward probability, while any biased choice behavior leads to lower
reward probabilities. The BMRS algorithm takes the reward history of the
monkeys into account and changes the probabilities for rewarding a direct
or inferred reach in favor of the alternative that was chosen less often so far:
pðRdÞ=Fðni  ndÞ
pðRiÞ=Fðnd  niÞ ;
where ni is the total number of rewarded inferred reaches and nd is the total
number of rewarded direct reaches. F was defined as
FðxÞ : =
8>><
>>:
1 x>1
2=3 x = 1
1=2 x = 0
1=3 x =  1
0 x< 1
:
The second reward schedule was the equal-probability reward schedule
(EPRS). In EPRS trials the monkeys were rewarded with 50% probability, no
matter whether they reached for the direct or inferred goal, and regardless
of the reward history. The reward probabilities for direct (Rd) or inferred (Ri)
choices were
pðRdÞ=pðRiÞ= 0:5:
With the EPRS, the reward probability is independent of the behavioral
strategy of the monkeys, as long as they chose between the two potential
goals (see Figure S5 for data with 100% reward probability).
Biased and Balanced Condition
The recorded data was split into two distinct data sets. One data set contains
only units that were recorded with the EPRS, before we trained the respective
monkey with the BMRS. Since both monkeys showed a very similar choice
bias during EPRS sessions (see Results), we refer to this data as the biased
data set. The second data set contains only units recorded after we used
BMRS and is referred to as balanced data set. Behavioral tests with the
PMG-NC trials were conducted at the end of the neuronal recording period
in the biased data set. Control experiments with simultaneous behavioral
and neural recording of biased PMG-NC trials confirmed that results and
conclusions are unaffected by this (see Figure S5).
Animal Preparation, Neural Recordings
Surgical procedures and neural recordings were described previously (Gail
et al., 2009). Animal care and all experimental procedures were conducted
in accordance with German laws governing animal care.
Neural Data Selection and Tuning Analyses
Extracellular recordings were conducted with up to five microelectrodes in
parallel (‘‘mini-matrix’’; Thomas Recording, Giessen, Germany) on each
chamber. Spike times and waveforms were recorded and subjected to addi-
tional offline sorting (Offline Sorter; Plexon).
All isolated units were tested for their directional selectivity (Kruskal-Wallis
test; four groups of different spatial cue positions; sample sizes defined by
the number of identical trial repetitions). Selectivity was tested independently546 Neuron 70, 536–548, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.for direct-cued and inferred-cued trials during the late memory period in the
DMG task (average spike rate during the last 300 ms of the memory period,
i.e., activity succeeding the precue with a time-lag of at least 500 ms, and
immediately preceding the GO cue). The late memory period was chosen to
extract movement planning activity without confounding effects of (1) imme-
diate visual input from the cue stimuli; (2) transition phases from visual to
motor-goal tuning (Gail and Andersen, 2006); or (3) visual and somatosensory
input and motor-control signals related to movement initiation.
Only neurons that were significantly selective in direct-cued trials of the
DMG task were used in the following analyses (Figure S6). For all analyses
that involved PMG-CI or PMG-NC trials, we additionally required the neurons
to be significantly directionally selective in the late memory period of PMG
trials (Kruskal-Wallis, see above).
Population Activity
To visualize the temporal dynamics of spatial representations on a population
level, we averaged the time-resolved spiking activity across all neurons that
were directionally selective during the memory period of PMG trials. Before
averaging, the directional selectivity profiles for each neuron were aligned
relative to the interpolated preferred direction in the late memory period of
the DMG task and normalized to the baseline level (average spike density in
the 300 ms before spatial cue onset). The population activity was only used
for illustrative purposes (see Figures 3C and 5C), not for quantitative statistical
analyses.
Analysis of Bimodal Selectivity Profiles
We used a direction modality contrast (DMC) to quantify the bimodality of indi-
vidual neuronal responses:
DMC=
RMD  ROD
RMD +ROD
:
RMD is the mean firing rate of a neuron during the last 300 ms of the memory
period of all PMG trials (PMG-CI and PMG-NC) at the same direction that
evoked the maximum response (MD) in the DMG task. ROD is the firing rate
for trials in the opposite-to-maximumdirection (OD). Since theMD ismeasured
relative to the direction of the spatial cue in direct-cued trials of the DMG task,
positive DMC indices indicate preferred selectivity for the direct motor goal (at
the spatial cue location), whereas negative values indicate preferred selectivity
for the inferred motor goal (opposite the spatial cue). Values around zero indi-
cate symmetric bimodal selectivity, not lack of selectivity, since neurons
without directional selectivity were removed from this analysis.
Choice-Selective Analyses
To differentiate between the selection and the preference hypotheses, we
sorted the PMG-NC trials in the balanced data set according to the free choice
of the monkey, and calculated the DMC separately for direct-choice and in-
ferred-choice trials. That means if in a PMG-NC task the monkey reached
toward a goal position as if the contextual instruction had been direct, the trial
was labeled ‘‘direct choice’’ and if he reached toward a goal position as if the
contextual instruction had been inferred, the trial was labeled ‘‘inferred
choice.’’ The absolute choice-selective DMC values were then compared to
the absolute original, choice-indifferent DMC values (average over all trials
without sorting them according to the choice) in a similarity analysis (illustrated
in Figure 4A). The DMG condition was used as a control for this similarity anal-
ysis (see Figure S2). To quantify the similarity between the choice-selective
DMC values and the choice-indifferent DMC values, we calculated the
distance from the unity line of the correlation plot, which is equivalent of calcu-
lating the difference between the choice-selective and choice-indifferent DMC
values. We then used a t test to determine if the distribution of these differ-
ences was significantly deviating from zero.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes six figures and can be found with this
article online at doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.02.053.
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